Philosophia Christi 14 (2):409-428 (2012)

Authors
Eric LaRock
Oakland University
Abstract
I argue that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort defended by David Armstrong and David Lewis) to reconsider the feasibility of their account of mind.
Keywords Armstrong, Consciousness, Functionalism, Irreducibility, Lewis,
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DOI 10.5840/pc201214233
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