Imaginative resistance and the moral/conventional distinction

Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241 (2005)
Authors
Neil Levy
Oxford University
Abstract
Children, even very young children, distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, inasmuch as they hold that the former, but not the latter, would still be wrong if there was no rule prohibiting them. Many people have taken this finding as evidence that morality is objective, and therefore universal. I argue that reflection on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance will lead us to question these claims. If a concept applies in virtue of the obtaining of a set of more basic facts, then it is authority independent, and we therefore resist the attempts of authorities to claim that it does not apply. Thus, the moral/conventional distinction is a product of imaginative resistance to claims that a concept does not apply when its supervenience base is in place (or vice versa). All we can rightfully conclude from the fact that children are disposed to make the moral/conventional distinction is that our moral concepts belong to the class of authority-independent concepts. Though the set of basic facts in virtue of which an authority-independent concept obtains must be objective, the concept itself might be conventional, inasmuch as we could easily draw its boundaries wider or narrower, or fail to have a concept that corresponds to these properties at all.
Keywords Metaethics, Resistance, Dissertation
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DOI 10.1080/09515080500169660
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References found in this work BETA

The Moral Judgement of the Child.Jean Piaget - 1933 - Philosophy 8 (31):373-374.
The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55-81.

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Citations of this work BETA

Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content.Neil Levy - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):351–367.
Cognitive Scientific Challenges to Morality.Neil Levy - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.
Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content.Neil Levy - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):351-367.
Confounds in Moral/Conventional Studies.K. J. P. Quintelier & D. M. T. Fessler - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):58-67.

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