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  1. Anti-Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good.Robert Merrihew Adams - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):114–132.
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  2. Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
    This paper argues that non-cognitivism about moral judgements is compatible with moral realism. In order to reveal the possibility, and plausibility, of this hitherto under-explored position in metaethics, it surveys a series of four increasingly fine-grained formulations of the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It argues that all but the last of these distinctions should be rejected, on the grounds that they lead advocates of non-cognitivism away from what initially motivated them to advocate non-cognitivism in the first place. One significant (...)
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  3. Moral Fictionalism by Kalderon, Mark. [REVIEW]Zed Adams - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1).
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  4. Cognitivism, Controversy, and Moral Heuristics.Matthew D. Adler - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):542-543.
    Sunstein aims to provide a nonsectarian account of moral heuristics, yet the account rests on a controversial meta-ethical view. Further, moral theorists who reject act consequentialism may deny that Sunstein's examples involve moral mistakes. But so what? Within a theory that counts consequences as a morally weighty feature of actions, the moral judgments that Sunstein points to are indeed mistaken, and the fact that governmental action at odds with these judgments will be controversial doesn't bar such action.
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  5. The Good and the Gross.Alexandra Plakias - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):261-278.
    Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and (...)
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  6. A Defense of Non-Cognitivism.Carl David Alm - 1998 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    There are three parts. Formulation of a form of non-cognitivism which gives a central role to moral emotions. Defense of the standard arguments for non-cognitivism. Response to standard objections to non-cognitivism. Throughout I give considerable attention to relevant important contributions by earlier writers. ; An emotion is grounded if it is held for a certain reason and the subject does not feel uncomfortable about having it for that reason. My central theses are: Thinking that one ought to do A is (...)
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  7. Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Moral Autonomy, Solved by Publicity.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - In M. Altman (ed.), Kant Handbook. Palgrave. pp. chapter 14.
    This chapter aims to situate Kant’s account of practical reason in metaethical debates. First, it explains the reasons why it is legitimate and instructive to discuss Kant’s relevance in contemporary metaethics, hence addressing some issues about the intended scope of metaethics and its relation to practical reason and psychology. Second, it defends an interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy, which avoids some paradoxes traditionally associated with self-legislation. Third, it shows that constructivism best captures Kant’s conception of practical reason and of (...)
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  8. Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - In Christine Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability, Autonomy and Applied Ethics. Routledge. pp. 13-32.
    In this chapter, I examine the concept of vulnerability as a complex constitutive feature of human agency and argue that it is both a constraint on and a resource for practical reasoning. When discussed as an ontological feature of human agency, vulnerability is primarily understood as an aspect of embodiment, which is problematic in different respects. First, in relation to the situatedness of human agency, vulnerability indicates that human agents are subjected to contextual contingencies. Second, in relation to temporality, vulnerability (...)
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  9. The Exploration of Moral Life.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...)
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  10. Constructivism in Metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct-- constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical (...)
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  11. Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology[REVIEW]Carla Bagnoli - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  12. Introduction.Carla Bagnoli & Gabriele Usberti - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):1-10.
    The articles of this volume address only some aspects of Nozick's philosophy: his conception of argument, knowledge, rationality, and identity. In examining Nozick's approach to these topics, one has to take issue, ultimately, with his peculiar conception of philosophy whose manifesto appears at the outset of Philosophical Explanations and is echoed in the introduction to philosophical method of Invariances . To transform philosophy into a science or build an impeccable deductive system was not Nozick's dream. He thought of philosophy as (...)
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  13. Proving a Moral Judgment.K. Baier - 1953 - Philosophical Studies 4 (3):33 - 44.
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  14. The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism.Nicholas Baima - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
    Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall (...)
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  15. James Griffin, Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, Pp. Xii + 180.Brian Barry - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (3):361.
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  16. The Finality of Moral Judgments: A Reply to Mrs. Foot.Lawrence C. Becker - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (3):364-370.
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  17. Explaining Unethical Behaviour Among People Motivated to Act Prosocially.David M. Bersoff - 1999 - Journal of Moral Education 28 (4):413-428.
    Moral reasoning theorists working in the constructivist tradition have tended to explain unethical behaviour by assuming that a breakdown occurs in the link between a person's moral judgement within a particular situation and his ultimate behaviour in that situation. This breakdown is usually seen as being the result of the individual ignoring his deontic judgement in favour of meeting a competing, non-moral social obligation or of fulfilling a selfish interest. This model of unethical behaviour has led to suggestions that moral (...)
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  18. Contextualism in Ethics.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
    In more than one way, context matters in ethics. Uncontroversially, the ethical status of an action might depend on context: though it is typically wrong not to keep a promise, some contexts make it permissible. More controversially, some have suggested that the meaning or truth-conditions of a moral judgment or moral assertion depend not only on the properties of the act it concerns and the context in which it would be performed, but also on features of the context in which (...)
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  19. Metaethical Contextualism Defended.Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):7-36.
    We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised (...)
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  20. Enoch's Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism.Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):101–112.
    Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also (...)
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  21. Meta‐Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind.Reid D. Blackman - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):273-292.
    There is a difference between an object's being good simpliciter and an object's being good of its kind, and the vast majority of philosophers have supposed that it is the former variety of goodness that is relevant to ethics. I argue that one may be a meta-ethical realist while employing the notion of good of a kind to the exclusion of good simpliciter; I call such a view kindism. I distinguish between two varieties of kindism, explicate the details of one (...)
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  22. Hedonic Naturalism.David Brax - manuscript
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  23. A Puzzle About Moral Motivation.David O. Brink - unknown
    Our puzzle about moral motivation can be seen as a tension that we encounter when we try to reconcile intellectual and practical aspects of morality. Cognitivists interpret moral judgments as expressing cognitive attitudes, such as belief. Moral judgments ascribe properties – axiological, deontic, and aretaic – to persons, actions, institutions, and policies. Internalists believe that moral judgments necessarily engage the will and motivate. We expect people to be motivated to act in accord with their moral judgments and would find it (...)
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  24. Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics.David O. Brink - 1999 - Inquiry 42 (2):195 – 212.
    A cognitivist interpretation of moral inquiry treats it, like other kinds of inquiry, as aiming at true belief. A dialectical conception of moral inquiry represents the justification for a given moral belief as consisting in its intellectual fit with other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. The essay appeals to semantic considerations to defend cognitivism as a default metaethical view; it defends a dialectical conception of moral inquiry by examining Sidgwick's ambivalence about the probative value of appeal to common moral beliefs (...)
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  25. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of (...)
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  26. How Not to Argue for Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2011 - In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 64-87.
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  27. Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus . But (...)
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  28. The Science of Morality and its Normative Implications.Tommaso Bruni, Matteo Mameli & Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (2):159-172.
    Neuromoral theorists are those who claim that a scientific understanding of moral judgment through the methods of psychology, neuroscience and related disciplines can have normative implications and can be used to improve the human ability to make moral judgments. We consider three neuromoral theories: one suggested by Gazzaniga, one put forward by Gigerenzer, and one developed by Greene. By contrasting these theories we reveal some of the fundamental issues that neuromoral theories in general have to address. One important issue concerns (...)
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  29. Aesthetic Internalism and Two Normative Puzzles.Strandberg Caj - 2016 - Studi di Estetica 6:23-70.
    One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation to act. Moral Internalism is regarded to yield the prime argument against Moral Cognitivism and for Moral Non-Cognitivism. In this paper, I investigate the significance of the corresponding claim in metaaesthetics. I pursue two lines of argument. First, I argue that Aesthetic Internalism – the view that there is a conceptually necessary connection between aesthetic value (...)
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  30. Values and Conflicts of Values in the Pragmatist Tradition.H. G. Callaway - 1997 - In Samuel Natale & Mark Fenton (eds.), Business Education and Training: A Value-Laden Process. Volume I: Education and Value Conflict. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. pp. 44-57.
    This paper proceeds from an analysis (Callaway 1992, pp. 239-240) of a role of conflict in the origin of value commitments, a pervasive sociological pattern in the development of unifying group values which transforms personal conflicts, or differences, into large-scale collective conflicts. I have urged that these forces are capable of distorting even the cognitive processes of science and that they are a chief reason why value claims are regarded as incapable of objective evaluation. The thesis of the present paper (...)
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  31. Doxastic Desire and Attitudinal Monism.Douglas I. Campbell - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy (...)
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  32. What is Moral Judgment?Richmond Campbell - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-349.
    Moral knowledge appears to require moral judgments to be states of belief, yet they must at the same time be states of desire and feeling if they embody the motivation that we feel when we make moral judgments. How can the same judgment be a state of belief and a state of desire or feeling, simultaneously? [...] This problem may be resolved, I shall contend, by understanding moral judgments to be complex, multifunctional states that normally comprise both states of belief (...)
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  33. Moral Realism and Wanton Cruelty.George R. Carlson - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):49-56.
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  34. Review of Terence Cuneo's Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW]Spencer Case - 2015 - Tradition and Discovery 42 (1):59-62.
  35. Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition.Wayne Christensen & John Sutton - 2012 - In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. pp. 327-347.
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in (...)
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  36. Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition.Andy Clark - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):267-289.
    Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exem- plar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar- based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition – like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition – depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of multiple factors and forces (...)
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  37. Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment.Steve Clarke - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.
    Jonathan Haidt ( 2001 ) advances the 'Social Intuitionist' account of moral judgment , which he presents as an alternative to rationalist accounts of moral judgment , hitherto dominant in psychology. Here I consider Haidt's anti-rationalism and the debate that it has provoked in moral psychology , as well as some anti-rationalist philosophical claims that Haidt and others have grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators. I will argue that although the case for anti-rationalism in moral psychology (...)
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  38. Review: Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. [REVIEW]David Copp - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):476-481.
  39. Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.David Copp - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):1-43.
    Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might (...)
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  40. The Relevance of Moral Disagreement. Some Worries About Nondescriptivist Cognitivism.Josep E. Corbí - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):217-233.
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper,I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.
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  41. Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  42. Moral Judgment and Understanding.A. S. Cua - 1970 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (4):614-616.
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  43. Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - manuscript
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  44. Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  45. The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
    ��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...)
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  46. Review of Mark Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW]Edmund Dain - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):146-9.
  47. Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism.Michael J. Deem - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (5):727-746.
    Normative realists tend to consider evolutionary debunking arguments as posing epistemological challenges to their view. By understanding Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian dilemma’ argument in this way, they have overlooked and left unanswered her unique scientific challenge to normative realism. This paper counters Street’s scientific challenge and shows that normative realism is compatible with an evolutionary view of human evaluative judgment. After presenting several problems that her adaptive link account of evaluative judgments faces, I outline and defend an evolutionary byproduct perspective on (...)
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  48. The Merits of Dispositional Moral Realism.Kevin Michael DeLapp - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):1-18.
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  49. What a Kantian Can Know a Priori? A Defense of Moral Cognitivism.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2011 - In Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlstrom & Howard Williams (eds.), Politics and Metaphysics in Kant.
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  50. Moral Value as Irreducible, Objective, and Cognizable.Raphael Demos - 1945 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (2):163-194.
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