Adorno, Marx, and abstract domination

Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (8) (2023)
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Abstract

This article reconstructs and defends Theodor Adorno’s social theory by motivating the central role of abstract domination within it. Whereas critics such as Axel Honneth have charged Adorno with adhering to a reductive model of personal domination, I argue that the latter rather understands domination as a structural and de-individualized feature of capitalist society. If Adorno’s social theory is to be explanatory, however, it must account for the source of the abstractions that dominate modern individuals and, in particular, that of value. While such an account remains undeveloped in Adorno, Marx provides resources for its development, in positing the constitution of value neither in production nor exchange alone, but in the social totality. This article argues that Marx’s account is compatible with Adorno’s, and that it may be used to render Adorno’s theory of domination more credible on explanatory grounds.

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Eli B. Lichtenstein
Lewis & Clark College

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References found in this work

The Actuality of Philosophy.Theodor W. Adorno - 1977 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 1977 (31):120-133.
The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory.Axel Honneth - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37:85.
The actuality of philosophy.Theodor W. Adorno - 2000 - In O., Connor & B. (eds.), The Adorno Reader. Blackwell. pp. 120-133.

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