The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26 (2010)

Authors
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Abstract
This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
Keywords Normative reasons  Reasons and facts  Reasons and ends  Reasons and principles
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.

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What Distinguishes the Practice-Dependent Approach to Justice?Eva Erman & Niklas Möller - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (1):3-23.

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