Imperative content and the painfulness of pain

Abstract
Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: Affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties
Keywords Philosophy of Mind  Pain  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-010-9172-0
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References found in this work BETA
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - forthcoming - Noûs 2017.
Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-16.
Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.

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