Experimental practice and an error statistical account of evidence

Philosophy of Science 67 (3):207 (2000)
In seeking general accounts of evidence, confirmation, or inference, philosophers have looked to logical relationships between evidence and hypotheses. Such logics of evidential relationship, whether hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian, or instantiationist fail to capture or be relevant to scientific practice. They require information that scientists do not generally have (e.g., an exhaustive set of hypotheses), while lacking slots within which to include considerations to which scientists regularly appeal (e.g., error probabilities). Building on my co-symposiasts contributions, I suggest some directions in which a new and more adequate philosophy of evidence can move
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DOI 10.1086/392819
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Wendy S. Parker (2008). Franklin, Holmes, and the Epistemology of Computer Simulation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):165 – 183.

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