Proximal intentions, intention-reports, and vetoing

Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14 (2008)
Abstract
Proximal intentions are intentions to do something at once. Are they ever among the causes of actions? Can agents “veto” or retract proximal intentions and refrain from acting on them in certain experimental settings? When, in controlled studies, do proximal intentions to press a button, for example, arise? And when does the agent's consciousness of these intentions arise? This article explores these questions—and evaluates some answers that have been offered—in light of the results of some recent research in neuroscience. Methods for timing the onset of proximal intentions and onsets of consciousness of such intentions also receive special attention.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080701867914
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Do We Have Free Will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.

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