Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation

Journal of Economic Theory 141:p. 100-113 (2008)
Abstract
According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow’s and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.
Keywords Discursive dilemma   Doctrinal paradox   Impossibility theorems   Independence of irrelevant alternatives   Judgment aggregation   Logical aggregation   Pareto principle
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Judgment Aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):22-32.

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