Self and will

When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer -just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non-transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. They must allow in consequence either for joint ownership of one and the same mental item, or for incompatible simultaneous decisions by one and the same person, or for new forms of death. This makes them disquieting. Another rival invokes a transitive and symmetrical relation defined in terms of co-consciousness. Even that allows for incongruous simultaneities. The volitional theory is free from such disadvantages.
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DOI 10.1080/09672559708570846
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Time and Division.Barry F. Dainton - 1992 - Ratio 5 (2):102-128.

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Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence.Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
The Self and the Phenomenal.Barry F. Dainton - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):365-89.

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