36 found
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  1.  68
    Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third (...)
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  2.  47
    The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity.Raymond Martin & John Barresi - 2006 - Columbia University Press.
    This book traces the development of theories of the self and personal identity from the ancient Greeks to the present day. From Plato and Aristotle to Freud and Foucault, Raymond Martin and John Barresi explore the works of a wide range of thinkers and reveal the larger intellectual trends, controversies, and ideas that have revolutionized the way we think about ourselves. The authors open with ancient Greece, where the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the materialistic atomists laid the groundwork for (...)
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  3.  56
    Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
  4.  26
    (1 other version)Hazlitt on the Future of the Self.Raymond Martin & John Barresi - 1995 - Journal of the History of Ideas 56 (3):463.
  5.  98
    Prospects for the cyberiad: Certain limits on human self-knowledge in the cybernetic age.John Barresi - 1987 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (March):19-46.
  6.  38
    Sharing a perspective precedes the understanding of that perspective.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):513-514.
  7.  50
    You can cheat people, but not nature!John Barresi - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):544-545.
    The psychological mechanisms implicated in psychopathy do not limit their activity to those behaviors that support a cheater strategy in social games. They result in a number of other clearly maladaptive behaviors that do not directly involve other individuals. Thus, any gains that might arise from the use of a cheater strategy in social situations are probably lost elsewhere.
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  8. The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  9. Personal identity.Raymond Martin & John Barresi (eds.) - 2003 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.
    These are the very scholars that were involved in initiating the revolution in personal identity theory.
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  10.  89
    History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self.John Barresi & Raymond Martin - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This article examines the historical conception of the words self and person in philosophical theory. It discusses John Locke's definition of the self as the conscious thinking thing and the person as a thinking intelligent being. It describes the Platonist view of the self as spiritual substance and Aristotelian belief that the self is a hylomorphic substance. It also explores the relevant topics of Epicureanism atomism, Cartesian dualism, and the developmental and social origin of self-concepts.
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  11.  24
    (1 other version)Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century.John Barresi & Raymond Martin - 1999 - New York: Routledge. Edited by John Barresi.
    _Naturalization of the Soul_ charts the development of the concepts of soul and self in Western thought, from Plato to the present. It fills an important gap in intellectual history by being the first book to emphasize the enormous intellectual transformation in the eighteenth century, when the religious 'soul' was replaced first by a philosophical 'self' and then by a scientific 'mind'. The authors show that many supposedly contemporary theories of the self were actually discussed in the eighteenth century, and (...)
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  12. The neuroscience of social understanding.John Barresi - 2008 - The Shared Mind 1:39–66.
    In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha and E. Itkonen (Eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, in press.
     
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  13.  39
    Intentional Relations and Divergent Perspectives in Social Understanding.John Barresi - unknown
    selves than we care about others, so we are more likely to attend to and interpret our own activities than we are likely to attend to and interpret the activities of others. Yet, it is also a common notion that a person has the least knowledge of his or her own biases or prejudices, and that it is often a naive observer, who can better interpret the meaning of someone's actions when such biases are involved.
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  14. On becoming a person.John Barresi - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
    How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through (...)
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  15.  84
    Extending self-consciousness into the future.John Barresi - 2001 - In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 141-161.
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  16.  44
    Fission Examples in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Personal Identity Debate.Raymond Martin, John Barresi & Alessandro Giovannelli - 1998 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (3):323 - 348.
  17. Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (stalinesque) and misremembering (orwellian) accounts of consciousness.John Barresi & John R. Christie - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):347-365.
    It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...)
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  18.  45
    The subjective-objective dimension in the individual-society connection: A duality perspective.Tim J. Juckes & John Barresi - 1993 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (2):197–216.
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  19. Consciousness and intentionality.John Barresi - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
    My goal is to try to understand the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. My basic methodological assumption is that embodied agents, through their sensory-motor, affective, and cognitive activities directed at objects, engage in intentional relations with these objects. Furthermore, I assume that intentional relations can be viewed from a first- and a third-person perspective. What is called primary consciousness is the first-person perspective of the agent engaged in a current intentional relation. While primary consciousness posits an implicit.
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  20.  31
    (4 other versions)Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2002.Sven Arvidson, John Barresi, Tim Bayne, Pierre Bovet, Andrew Brook, Andy Clark, Lester Embree, William Friedman, Peter Goldie & David Hunter - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95):151-152.
  21. Intentionality, consciousness and intentional relations: From constitutive phenomenology to cognitive science.John Barresi - 2004 - In Lester Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer. pp. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  22. Ansorge, Ulrich, 528 Arnel Trevena, Judy, 162, 308.Elisabeth Bacon, Clive G. Ballard, William P. Banks, James J. Barrell, John Barresi, Melissa R. Beck, Derek Besner, Uri Bibi, Niels Birbaumer & Mark Bishop - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11:689-690.
     
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  23.  95
    Black and white like me.John Barresi - manuscript
    John Griffi n’s classic on racism, Black Like Me (1960), provides an interesting text with which to investigate the development of a dialogical self. Griffi n becomes a black man for only a short period of time, but during that time he develops a black social identity and sense of personal identity, that contrasts radically with his former white identity. When he looks into a mirror on several occasions he engages in a dialogue with himself, as both a black and (...)
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  24.  34
    Even an “epistemic triangle” has three sides.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):98-99.
    By focusing primarily on communication between adult and child and on adult-set criteria for appropriate action, Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) account of the development of social understanding in the epistemic triangle tends toward an enculturation view, while diminishing the role of individuals. What their proposed mechanism fails to acknowledge is that the two agents in the epistemic triangle necessarily have independent perspectives of the object and of each other.
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  25.  29
    Giving Meaning to Movement: A Developmental Study.John Barresi - unknown
    Recently, researchers have been investigating the effects of kinematic stimulus properties on pattern perception and recognition, However, the stimulus properties that are used to discriminate animate from inanimate objects have received relatively little attention. Earlier research has indicated that the external movement of artificially generated objects is perceived as animate by observers of all ages. In this investigation, children in Grades 1, 4, and 7 and university adults were asked to describe what they saw after viewing computer-generated displays of two (...)
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  26.  33
    Group selection and “the pious gene”.John Barresi - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):777-778.
    If selection at the group level is to be considered more than a mere possibility, it is important to find phenomena that are best explained at this level of selection. I argue that human religious phenomena provide evidence for the selection of a “pious gene” at the group level, which results in a human tendency to believe in a transcendental reality that encourages behavioral conformity to collective as opposed to individual interest.
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  27.  86
    On Earth As It Is in Heaven: Trinitarian Influences on Locke's Account of Personal Identity.John Barresi - 2006 - The Pluralist 1 (1):110 - 128.
    Locke’s concepts of person and self as they first appeared in the 1694 essay were not original to him but had already appeared in the Trinitarian controversy in England in the early 1690s. In particular, William Sherlock, who in 1690 argued that the Trinity might be understood as composed of three distinct self-conscious minds or persons in one God, previously used not only concepts but also phrases that Locke used in his definition of person. Both Sherlock and Locke defined person (...)
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  28.  75
    On seeing our selves and others as persons.John Barresi - unknown
    Human beings may be the only organisms capable of thinking of self and other in equivalent ways – as selves and persons. Most organisms think about their own activities differently than they do the activities of others. A few large-brained organisms like chimps and dolphins sometimes think of the activities of self and other in the same way. But, only humans think quite generally in this manner. In this paper I give a description of our commonsense notions of self and (...)
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  29.  67
    Some boundary conditions on embodied agents sharing a common world.John Barresi - 2008 - In Ipke Wachsmuth, Manuela Lenzen & Günther Knoblich (eds.), Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines. Oxford University Press. pp. 29.
  30. Self-concern from Priestley to Hazlitt.John Barresi & Raymond Martin - 2003 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (3):499 – 507.
    himself or a proper object of his egoistic self-concern. Hazlitt concluded that belief in personal identity must be an acquired imaginary conception and that since in reality each of us is no more related to his or her future self than to the future self of any other person none of us is 2 ‘.
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  31.  56
    The origins of autism: Commentary on “autism as a downstream effect of primary difficulties in intersubjectivity going with abnormal development of brain connectivity” by Filippo muratori and Sandra Maestro.John Barresi - manuscript
    International Journal for Dialogical Science, 2007, 2, 119-124.
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  32. The rise and fall of the conscious self: A history of western concepts of self and personal identity.John Barresi - manuscript
    I will trace the history of western conceptions of soul and self from the ancient Greeks to the present. The story line that I will present is based mainly on material covered in two books by Ray Martin and myself: _The Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the_.
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  33.  49
    Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  34. Consciousness and information processing: A reply to durgin.John Christie & John Barresi - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
    Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which (...)
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  35.  28
    Does motor mimicry contribute to emotion recognition?Cindy Hamon-Hill & John Barresi - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):447-448.
    We focus on the role that motor mimicry plays in the SIMS model when interpreting whether a facial emotional expression is appropriate to an eliciting context. Based on our research, we find general support for the SIMS model in these situations, but with some qualifications on how disruption of motor mimicry as a process relates to speed and accuracy in judgments.
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  36.  74
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Joshua Knobe, Dingmar Van Eck, Susan Blackmore, Henk Bij De Weg, John Barresi, Roblin Meeks, Julian Kiverstein & Drew Rendall - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):785 – 817.
    JOHANNES ROESSLER & NAOMI EILAN (Eds.)Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003ISBN 0199245622 (pbk, 415 pages, $39.95)In The Principles of Psychology, William James presents an interesting case of a ‘...
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