A Third Conception of Epistemic Injustice

Studies in Philosophy and Education 40 (4):381-398 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Scholars of epistemology have identified two conceptions of epistemic injustice: discriminatory epistemic injustice and distributive epistemic injustice. The former refers to wrongs to one’s capacity as a knower that are the result of identity prejudice. The latter refers to violations of one’s right to know what one is entitled to know. This essay advances a third conception, formative epistemic injustice, which refers to wrongs to one’s capacity as a knower that are the result of or result in malformation—the undue restriction of one’s formative capacities. The author argues that formative epistemic injustice is a distinctly educational wrong and that it brings to light important epistemic injustices that standard accounts of epistemic injustice either downplay or are unable to capture. This third conception of epistemic injustice is an important analytic tool for theorizing both epistemic injustice and educational justice.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Revisiting Epistemic Injustice in the Context of Agency.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):703-706.
A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice.Laura Beeby - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
Epistemic Injustice.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2020 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
Content Focused Epistemic Injustice.Robin Dembroff & Dennis Whitcomb - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
Science Communication and Epistemic Injustice.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1):1-9.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-17

Downloads
43 (#269,416)

6 months
22 (#46,945)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?