Deductivism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2023 (2023)
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Abstract

Deductivism says that a mathematical sentence s should be understood as expressing the claim that s deductively follows from appropriate axioms. For instance, deductivists might construe “2+2=4” as “the sentence ‘2+2=4’ deductively follows from the axioms of arithmetic”. Deductivism promises a number of benefits. It captures the fairly common idea that mathematics is about “what can be deduced from the axioms”; it avoids an ontology of abstract mathematical objects; and it maintains that our access to mathematical truths requires nothing beyond our ability to make logical deductions. Sections 1 and 2 define and motivate deductivism in more detail. Section 3 covers four authors (Russell, Hilbert, Pasch, Curry) who have endorsed deductivism at some point. Section 4 aims to clarify what semantic claim deductivists make. Sections 5–9 review objections to deductivism and possible replies.

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Author Profiles

Fabian Pregel
University of Oxford
A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford

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References found in this work

Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1970 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1937 - New York,: Routledge.
Mathematical Thought and its Objects.Charles Parsons - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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