Topoi 24 (2):209-220 (2005)

Marc Pauly
University of Groningen
Social processes like voting procedures, debates, etc. depend crucially on the precise rules which define them. This rule sensitivity is illustrated by two examples, in the case of preference aggregation by the parliamentary debate concerning the German capital, and in the case of judgement aggregation by the doctrinal paradox or discursive dilemma. Using social choice functions and the theory of mechanism design, one can formulate what it means for a particular set of rules to be correct under a given game-theoretic solution concept. Furthermore, it is argued that in particular methods from logic and computer science are useful to describe and reason about the rules of play in a precise manner.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Philosophy of Technology
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-005-5056-2
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References found in this work BETA

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin van Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569-585.

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Introduction.Fabio Paglieri - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):117-123.

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