Dual Control and the Causal Theory of Action: The Case of Non-intentional Action

In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press (2003)
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Josef Perner
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
Does bodily awareness interfere with highly skilled movement?Barbara Montero - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):105 – 122.
Action, Deviance, and Guidance.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Abstracta (2):41-59.

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