Loneliness as Cause

Topoi 42 (5):1175-1184 (2023)
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Abstract

While loneliness has been linked to various mental and physical health problems, the sense in which loneliness is a cause of these conditions has so far attracted little philosophical attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing research on health effects of loneliness and therapeutic interventions through current approaches to causality. To deal with the problem of causality between psychological, social, and biological variables, the paper endorses a biopsychosocial model of health and disease. I will investigate how three main approaches to causality used in psychiatry and public health apply to loneliness: interventionism, mechanisms, and dispositional theories. Interventionism can specify whether loneliness causes specific effects, or whether a treatment works, incorporating results from randomized controlled trials. Mechanisms help explain how loneliness brings about negative health effects, spelling out psychological processes involved in lonely social cognition. Dispositional approaches help stress particular features of loneliness connected to negative social interactions, such as defensiveness. I will conclude by showing that previous research alongside emerging approaches to health effects of loneliness lend themselves to analysis in terms of the causal models under discussion.

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Elena Popa
Jagiellonian University

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References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences.Phyllis Illari & Jon Williamson - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):119-135.
Interpreting causality in the health sciences.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.

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