Epistemic action, extended knowledge, and metacognition

Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392 (2014)
Authors
Joëlle Proust
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of the agent, as a result of a process of enculturation. We argue that this view does not capture the role of sensitivity to epistemic norms in forming true beliefs. An analysis of epistemic actions, basic and extended, is proposed as offering an appropriate framework for crediting an agent with knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12038
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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Citations of this work BETA

Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.

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