Nonconceptual demonstrative reference

Abstract
The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The nonconceptual content of the mental states induced when one uses a perceptual demonstrative constitutes the mode of presentation of the perceptual demonstrative that individuates but does not identify the object of perceptual awareness and allows reference to it. On that account, perceptual demonstratives put us in a de re relationship with objects in the world through the non-conceptual information retrieved directly from the objects in the environment.
Keywords nonconceptual content  mental content  mental representation  reference  causal theory of reference  Kripke  Putnam  demonstratives  perception
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00561.x
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References found in this work BETA
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Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Defending Realism on the Proper Ground.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.
Reference, Perception, and Attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.

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