Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26 (1999)

Authors
Paul Raymont
University of Toronto at Mississauga
Abstract
I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more than her acquisition of these abilities. The physicalist can admit this, since it does not commit one to the view that there are any facts of which Mary was ignorant . I argue against this view, on the grounds that the knowledge of what an experience is like cannot be equated with the possession of any set of abilities
Keywords Epistemology  Knowledge  Physicalism  Jackson, F
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_1999_18
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
What Mary Didn’T Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
What Experience Teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. pp. 29--57.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
Knowing How and Pragmatic Intrusion.Alessandro Capone - 2011 - Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.
Something Like Ability.P. Noordhof - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense.Mahdi Zakeri & Majid Ghasemi - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):23-38.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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