Frege's theory of incomplete entities

Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):329-341 (1965)
This paper examines four arguments in support of Frege's theory of incomplete entities, the heart of his semantics and ontology. Two of these arguments are based upon Frege's contributions to the foundations of mathematics. These are shown to be question-begging. Two are based upon Frege's solution to the problem of the relation of language to thought and reality. They are metaphysical in nature and they force Frege to maintain a theory of types. The latter puts his theory of incomplete entities in the paradoxical position of maintaining that it is no theory at all. Moreover, his metaphysics rules out well-known suggestions for avoiding this difficulty
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DOI 10.1086/288057
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II. Frege as Idealist and Then Realist.Michael D. Resnik - 1979 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):350-357.

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