Dis-Illusioning Experiences

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1219-1236 (2023)
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Abstract

In his defense of Illusionism, D. Pereboom quotes S. Shoemaker as finding it mysterious how we can represent properties that are nowhere instantiated in our world. This paper begins by detailing the problem, clarifying its relation to Illusionism, and explaining the inadequacy of Pereboom’s response. It then examines papers by K. Frankish and F. Kammerer, and finds that they face the same problem. With this background, it becomes plausible that representation of uninstantiated properties is an endemic problem for illusionism. Responding by making such representation a _sui generis_ relation amounts to abandoning the physicalism that is typically cited as a reason for accepting illusionism about experiences. Appeal to quality spaces may seem to provide a way to solve the problem without admitting a _sui generis_ relation, but careful reflection reveals this to be a subtle version of the _sui generis_ response. There is thus strong reason to think that Illusionism harbors a problem to which it can give no physicalistically acceptable solution.

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William Robinson
Iowa State University

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References found in this work

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism.Derk Pereboom - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness.Keith Frankish - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):11-39.
A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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