The Ethics of Belief in a Burning World

Australasian Philosophical Review (forthcoming)
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Danielle Celermajer advocates for reconceptualizing responsibility in light of the climate crisis. I argue instead that we must understand current concepts of responsibility which are implicit in actual responsibility practices. I illustrate this by appeal to the practice of holding each other responsible for our beliefs-a practice in which we are constantly involved, but which is often obscured. It extends our responsibility to involuntary aspects of our own mind and involves socially distributed cognitive duties. Cognitive responsibility is part and parcel of shared human conceptual frameworks that we should work to uncover and fully understand rather than revise.



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Sebastian Schmidt
University of Zürich

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