Authors
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Argues against the rationality of self-concern. Non-instrumental interest in my own well-being is not justified by the fact that it is mine. This follows from the metaphysics of first-person thought, as thought about the object of immediate knowledge. The argument leaves room for rational self-interest as a form of self-love that is justified, like love for others, by the fact of our shared humanity.
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.018
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
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Citations of this work BETA

The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.
The Existence of Personites.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2051-2071.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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