Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):535-543 (2008)

Authors
Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis
Abstract
This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory and simulation theory , both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.003
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References found in this work BETA

Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.
The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction?Shaun Gallagher - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
Seeing Mind in Action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.

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