A sense of occasion

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314 (2005)
A continuous Oxford tradition on knowledge runs from John Cook Wilson to John McDowell. A central idea is that knowledge is not a species of belief, or that, in McDowell's terms, it is not a hybrid state; that, moreover, it is a kind of taking in of what is there that precludes one's being, for all one can see, wrong. Cook Wilson and McDowell differ on what this means as to the scope of knowledge. J.L. Austin set out the requisite foundations for McDowell to be right. McDowell has shown why the tradition, and his version of it, need to be right. But he does not accept Austin's innovation. That is a shame. For, despite McDowell's very great insightfulness, precisely that much separates him from a very powerful, and correct, view of what knowledge is
Keywords occasion-sensitivity   knowledge   epistemology   Austin
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00399.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,463
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
Alan Millar (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
Alan Millar (2007). The State of Knowing. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

97 ( #48,647 of 1,925,522 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #255,024 of 1,925,522 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.