Noûs 49 (4):748-775 (2015)

Authors
David Rose
Stanford University
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University
Abstract
We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics.
Keywords belief  knowledge  entailment thesis  folk psychology
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/nous.12048
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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Citations of this work BETA

Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Dual Character Concepts.Kevin Reuter - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (1):e12557.

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