Belief through Thick and Thin

Noûs 49 (4):748-775 (2015)
Abstract
We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics.
Keywords belief  knowledge  entailment thesis  folk psychology
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12048
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References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
Iteration and Fragmentation.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):656-673.

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