Radical interpretation and Moore's paradox

Theoria 74 (2):146-163 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract: Moore's sentences of the form "P & ∼I believe that P" and "P & I believe that ∼P" are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single strategy that underlies all such proposals. Having criticized these suggestions, I shall defend my own solution according to which Moorean sentences are defective not because of some associated logical impropriety but because their assertion violates a certain interpretive constraint, viz., the principle of charity, on an adequate theory of meaning.
Keywords belief  Moore's paradox  assertion  interpretation  justification
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00013.x
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.

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