Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle

Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261 (2005)
Abstract
Faced with the paradox of undermining futures, Humeans have resigned themselves to accounts of chance that severely conflict with our intuitions. However, such resignation is premature: The problem is Humean supervenience (HS), not Humeanism. This paper develops a projectivist Humeanism on which chance claims are understood as normative, rather than fact stating. Rationality constraints on the cotenability of norms and factual claims ground a factual-normative worlds semantics that, in addition to solving the Frege-Geach problem, delivers the intuitive set of possibilia for each chance law. Hence, the account does not entail HS, and the paradox does not arise. A confirmation theory is developed, and the 'principal principle' is justified.
Keywords Objective Chance  Principal Principle  Humeanism  Humean Supervenience  Explanation  Projectivism  Expressivism  Anti-Realism
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DOI 10.1086/428078
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