Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):84-93 (2015)

Authors
Jared Warren
Stanford University
Abstract
An influential argument against the possibility of truth by linguistic convention holds that while conventions can determine which proposition a given sentence expresses, they (conventions) are powerless to make propositions true or false. This argument has been offered in the literature by Lewy, Yablo, Boghossian, Sider and others. But despite its influence and prima facie plausibility, the argument: (i) equivocates between different senses of “making true”; (ii) mistakenly assumes hyperintensional contexts are intensional; and (iii) relies upon an implausible vision of the way that language works.
Keywords conventionalism  truth by convention  propositions
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu051
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.

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