Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):84-93 (2014)
An influential argument against the possibility of truth by linguistic convention holds that while conventions can determine which proposition a given sentence expresses, they (conventions) are powerless to make propositions true or false. This argument has been offered in the literature by Lewy, Yablo, Boghossian, Sider and others. But despite its influence and prima facie plausibility, the argument: (i) equivocates between different senses of “making true”; (ii) mistakenly assumes hyperintensional contexts are intensional; and (iii) relies upon an implausible vision of the way that language works.
|Keywords||conventionalism truth by convention propositions|
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Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences.Jared Warren - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1351-1371.
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