Philosophy of Science 50 (1):82-95 (1983)
The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate
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Citations of this work BETA
On Probabilistic Representation of Non-Probabilistic Belief Revision.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1):69 - 101.
Probability as a Measure of Information Added.Peter Milne - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):163-188.
Hypothetical Imperatives and Conditional Obligations.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1986 - Synthese 66 (1):111 - 133.
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