The debate about truth: Pragmatism without regulative ideas

Critical Horizons 4 (1):29-54 (2003)
Abstract
This paper argues that the concept of truth cannot be explained with the help of the idea of justification under ideal conditions. Truth is not a regulative idea. The attempt to replace a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth with one that is conceptually epistemic does not provide an exit from metaphysics. Truth and its justification do not coincide with reference to the ascription of judgements and beliefs. To save the normative power of truth no Archemedean point is needed.
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DOI 10.1163/156851603765200203
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