British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850 (2012)
Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
|Keywords||Bayesian epistemology convex sets probability|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Indefinite Probability Judgment: A Reply to Levi.Richard Jeffrey - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (4):586-591.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Calibration and Convexity: Response to Gregory Wheeler.J. Williamson - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):851-857.
Uncertainty, Credal Sets and Second Order Probability.Jonas Clausen Mork - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):353-378.
Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology.Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier.
Extensions of Expected Utility Theory and Some Limitations of Pairwise Comparisons.Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
On the Proximity of the Logical and 'Objective Bayesian' Interpretations of Probability.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):335-349.
Added to index2011-07-28
Total downloads81 ( #64,521 of 2,169,322 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #186,284 of 2,169,322 )
How can I increase my downloads?