Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326 (2010)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
|
Keywords | Disagreement Equal weight view Commutativity Averaging Credences Evidence Epistemic peer |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.
Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers’ Imprint 16:1--39.
Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise.Julia Staffel - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):273-286.
View all 13 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement.David Killoren - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.
Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.
Calibrated Probabilities and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Barry Lam - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1079-1098.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-03-16
Total views
247 ( #44,560 of 2,505,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #90,594 of 2,505,744 )
2009-03-16
Total views
247 ( #44,560 of 2,505,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #90,594 of 2,505,744 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads