Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326 (2010)
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| Abstract |
How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
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| Keywords | Disagreement Equal weight view Commutativity Averaging Credences Evidence Epistemic peer |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1 |
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Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.
Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers’ Imprint 16:1--39.
Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise.Julia Staffel - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):273-286.
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