Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326 (2010)
How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
|Keywords||Disagreement Equal weight view Commutativity Averaging Credences Evidence Epistemic peer|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
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