Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326 (2010)
Authors
Alastair Wilson
University of Birmingham
Abstract
How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
Keywords Disagreement  Equal weight view  Commutativity  Averaging  Credences  Evidence  Epistemic peer
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1
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References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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