Two dogmas of Kantian aesthetics
How do aesthetic judgements differ from ordinary empirical judgements? It is widely accepted that one important respect in which judgements of taste differ from empirical judgements is that they are based on some kind of felt reaction or response — typically a pleasure or displeasure. This doctrine gained its classic statement in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. And it is the basis for the prevalent view that in aesthetics, we must ’judge for ourselves’. The doctrine is generally taken to imply that a judgement which is not based on such a reaction is not a judgement of taste.
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