Theories that Refute Themselves

Philosophy Now (106):16-18 (2015)
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Abstract

Many philosophical positions wholly undermine themselves because to possess the truth that they claim for themselves they would have to be false. These are the theories that in one way or another reject the meaningfulness or attainability of objective truth.

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Arnold Zuboff
University College London

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