Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):278-290 (1987)

Authors
Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
This paper deals with the question of whether there is objectivist truth about set-theoretic matters. The dogmatist and skeptic agree that there is such truth. They disagree about whether this truth is knowable. In contrast, the relativist says there is no objective truth to be known. Two versions of relativism are distinguished in the paper. One of these versions is defended.
Keywords set theory  relativism  skepticism  axiom of choice
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DOI 10.2307/2220398
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