An analytical study on Samye debate held in 792-794 A.D. between the Indian monastic tradition headed by Pandit Kamalashila and the Chinese tradition of Ch'an (Zen) by Hoshang Buddhist monk for which form of Buddhism should prevail in Tibet.

Critical study on the life and works of Chos rgyal Khri-srong-lde-btsan, the 38th king of Tibet with special reference to Nyaya (tshad ma) text Bka' yang dag paʼi tshad ma.

Critical study predominantly on Budhist philosophy; includes some artciles on Tibetan literary criticism.

Study on general principles of Buddhist logic.

Collection of writings on Buddhist logic.

Selected works of author predominantly on Buddhist dialectical and logical study.

Translation and commentaries to the famous Mongolian Buddhist philosophy work written by Zanabazar.

Buddhist dialectic reasoning and debates for beginner.

Collection of lectures delivered by author at Beijing University on Buddhist philosophy and its relevant questions/answers.

Lecture on pursuing proper undertsanding of Buddhist moral ethics versus scientific education.

On the fundamental essence of Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Collected works of the author on Buddhism and Dge-lugs-pa doctrines; includes biography.

Analytical view on Buddhist logic in dialectical debate.

Literal explanation of the ʼJam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa Ṅag-dbaṅ-brtson-ʼgrus's text Grub mthaʼi rnam par bźag pa ʼkhrul spoṅ gdoṅ lṅaʼi sgra dbyaṅs kun mkhyen lam bzaṅ gsal baʼi rin chen sgron me, deals on comparative study of the philosophical systems (siddhānta) of Buddhism and Hinduism.

Buddhits logical debates according to Kagyudpa school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Collected works of Shes-rab-rgya-mtsho, 1884-1968 on Gelukpa doctrines etc.

Views on Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophical positions (siddhānta).

On the developments of logic and epistemology in India, and the history of logic and epistemology in India and Tibet.

Study on the development and differences in philosophy among various Buddhist sects.

Study on Tibetan Buddhist logic; includes some poems and essays.

Study on Buddhist logic according to Candrakīrti.

Commentary on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, a classical verse work on the Vaibhāṣika school in Buddhist philosophy.

Basic course of study of elementary Buddhist logic and dialectrical studies of Lamaist Buddhist in Tibet.

Elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Exegesis of Blo rig and Rtags rigs, treatise in logic in Tibetan Buddhism.

Collection of texts on dialectial study of Buddhist logic.

Selected works of author's predominantly on Buddhist dialectical studies and mind training (Blo-sbyoṅ).

On Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Critical study on Mādhyamika philosophy of Madhyamakāvatāra of Candrakīrti.

Comparative study of the philosophical systems of the Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogacarya, and Madhyamaka schools of Indian Buddhism with non-Buddhist tenets.

The paper aims to explicate on the basis of the concept of psychologism the debate between Fichte and Schelling on the first philosophy. It moves from some statements of the year 1801–1806 that Schelling makes in the context of his philosophy of nature as well as of her relationship to Fichte’s doctrine of science. Because of his various meanings, of them the two philosophers do not seem to be always conscious, the category of psychologism is not as clear as it (...) instantly could appear. It comes for different reasons along with concepts like anthropologism, philosophy of reflection, life as well as knowledge.Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist, die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Fichte und Schelling um die erste Philosophie anhand des Begriffs von „Psychologismus“ nochmals zu erläutern. Ausgangspunkt stellen einige Äußerungen dar, die Schelling in verschiedenen Schriften aus den Jahren 1801–1806 im Zusammenhang mit der Naturphilosophie sowie deren Verhältnis zur Wissenschaftslehre macht. Man wird sehen, dass die Kategorie des Psychologismus gar nicht so eindeutig ist, wie es auf den ersten Blick aussehen könnte; in sie fallen nämlich unterschiedliche Bedeutungen, die innerhalb der Debatte zwischen Fichte und Schelling im Spiel sind und derer die Disputanten selbst sich nicht unbedingt bewusst zu sein scheinen. Mit der Kategorie des Psychologismus gehen aus unterschiedlichen Gründen Begriffe wie Anthropologismus, Reflexionsphilosophie, Leben bzw. Wissen einher. (shrink)

It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...) epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)