Order:
See also
  1. Abortion, Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and Waste.David A. Jensen - 2008 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (1):27-41.
    Can one consistently deny the permissibility of abortion while endorsing the killing of human embryos for the sake of stem cell research? The question is not trivial; for even if one accepts that abortion is prima facie wrong in all cases, there are significant differences with many of the embryos used for stem cell research from those involved in abortion—most prominently, many have been abandoned in vitro, and appear to have no reasonably likely meaningful future. On these grounds one might (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  13
    Representing the Agent Through Second-Order States.David A. Jensen - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):69 - 88.
    Some recent views of action have claimed that a correct conceptual account of action must include second-order motivational states. This follows from the fact that first-order motivational states such as desires account for action or mere behavior in which the agent's participation is lacking; thus, first-order motivational states cannot by themselves account for action in which the agent participates, so-called full-blooded action. I argue that representing the agent's participation by means of second-order states is bound to fail because it misrepresents (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  2
    Prenatal Parental Designing of Children and the Problem of Acceptance.David A. Jensen - 2018 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (4):529-535.
    Seemingly ever improving medical technology and techniques portend the possibility of prenatally enhancing otherwise healthy, normal children—seamlessly enhancing or adding to a child’s natural abilities and characteristics. Though parents normally engage in enhancing children, i.e., child rearing, these technologies present radically new possibilities. This sort of enhancement, I argue, is morally problematic for the parent: the expectations of the enhancing parent necessarily conflict with attitudes of acceptance that moral parenting requires. Attitudes of acceptance necessitate that parents are open to the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark