Die Rede vom Postfaktischen bestimmt die aktuelle Diskussion zur vermeintlichen Objektivität der Berichterstattung audiovisueller Massenmedien. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Problemen, die durch das Postfaktische aufgeworfen werden, ist jedoch nicht neu, sondern bereits auf vielfältige Weise in klassischen und aktuellen Theorien des Dokumentarfilms diskutiert worden. Der Artikel plädiert dafür, den Begriff des Postfaktischen unter Hinzuziehung dieser Theorien (und auch filmischer Produktionen) von Vertov, Grierson, Balàzs, Buñuel und Niney fruchtbar zu machen. The talk of post-truth dominates the current discussion concerning the alleged (...) objectivity of news-coverage via audio-visual mass media. An examination of the problems raised by post-truth, however, is nothing new but rather has been discussed in many ways by traditional and contemporary documentary film-theories. This article makes a case for revitalizing the term of post-truth with the help of those theories (as well as cinematic productions) by Vertov, Grierson, Balàzs, Buñuel and Niney. (shrink)

The talk of post-truth dominates the current discussion concerning the alleged objectivity of news-coverage via audio-visual mass media. An examination of the problems raised by post-truth, however, is nothing new but rather has been discussed in many ways by traditional and contemporary documentary film-theories. This article makes a case for revitalizing the term of post-truth with the help of those theories (as well as cinematic productions) by Vertov, Grierson, Balàzs, Buñuel and Niney.

We explore how risk preferences affect pro-social behavior under uncertainty. We analyze a modified dictator game in which the dictator can, by reducing her own sure payoff, increase the odds that an unknown recipient wins a lottery. We first augment a standard social preferences model with reference-dependent risk attitudes and then test the model’s predictions for the dictator’s giving behavior using a laboratory experiment. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that the relationship between giving behavior and a (...) giver’s loss aversion is mediated by the strength of the giver’s pro-social preferences. Among more pro-social dictators, an increase in loss aversion increases the likelihood that a dictator contributes to a recipient. (shrink)