The cremation of human bodies and the incineration of urban waste provide two interrelated examples of technologies using the destructive power of fire that “travelled” in both directions between India and the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather than granting an automatic ascendency to western ways of burning the dead or disposing of urban rubbish, these case studies indicate the manner in which culture and environment inhibited or prevented their advance and favoured the survival or re-articulation of pre-existing (...) technological practices and the socio-political infrastructure in which they were embedded. In the process of travelling, in part made possible by the agency of colonial personnel and the instruments of imperial exchange, but also through Indian opinion and diasporic dissemination, some technologies substantially changed their meaning, context and material form while others, seemingly untouched, underwent more subtle transformation. (shrink)

Bien que l’incinération soit une pratique funéraire de plus en plus fréquente en France, les enfants endeuillés restent souvent privés d’explication sur ce rituel, comme si celui-ci était plus traumatique et difficile à aborder que l’inhumation. L’article fait l’hypothèse que les théories thanatologiques infantiles présentent des spécificités dans de tels contextes. Cette réflexion s’appuie sur l’expérience clinique de l’auteur auprès d’enfants endeuillés et plus particulièrement sur le suivi de trente-six enfants de moins de 10 ans dont un proche a (...) été incinéré. Après un rappel de la place de l’incinération dans la culture française, l’article montre comment les enfants se représentent l’incinération en fonction de leur âge. Enfin, il aborde des perspectives pour la prise en charge de ces enfants et le soutien à leurs proches. (shrink)

Bien que l’incinération soit une pratique funéraire de plus en plus fréquente en France, les enfants endeuillés restent souvent privés d’explication sur ce rituel, comme si celui-ci était plus traumatique et difficile à aborder que l’inhumation. L’article fait l’hypothèse que les théories thanatologiques infantiles présentent des spécificités dans de tels contextes. Cette réflexion s’appuie sur l’expérience clinique de l’auteur auprès d’enfants endeuillés et plus particulièrement sur le suivi de trente-six enfants de moins de 10 ans dont un proche a (...) été incinéré. Après un rappel de la place de l’incinération dans la culture française, l’article montre comment les enfants se représentent l’incinération en fonction de leur âge. Enfin, il aborde des perspectives pour la prise en charge de ces enfants et le soutien à leurs proches. (shrink)

The cremation of human bodies and the incineration of urban waste provide two interrelated examples of technologies using the destructive power of fire that “travelled” in both directions between India and the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather than granting an automatic ascendency to western ways of burning the dead or disposing of urban rubbish, these case studies indicate the manner in which culture and environment inhibited or prevented their advance and favoured the survival or re-articulation of pre-existing (...) technological practices and the socio-political infrastructure in which they were embedded. In the process of travelling, in part made possible by the agency of colonial personnel and the instruments of imperial exchange, but also through Indian opinion and diasporic dissemination, some technologies substantially changed their meaning, context and material form while others, seemingly untouched, underwent more subtle transformation. (shrink)

Demographic characteristics have been recognized as an important factor affecting public acceptance of waste-to-energy incineration facilities. The present study explores whether the differences in public acceptance of WTE incineration facilities caused by demographic characteristics are consistent in residential groups under different perceived stress using data collected by a large-scale questionnaire survey conducted in three second-tier cities in China. The result of data analysis using a T-test shows firstly that people with low perceived stress have higher public acceptance of WTE incineration (...) facilities. Second, the differences in public acceptance of WTE incineration facilities caused by demographic characteristics vary in residential groups with different perceived stress levels. The findings enrich the knowledge system related to demographic characteristics research on NIMBY infrastructure projects and provide the theoretical basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies about NIMBY infrastructure sitting. (shrink)

Sociologists of risk tend to presume that populations have static perceptions of risk that can be correlated with their degree of technical expertise or their structural relation to society. Such commentators show little interest in human agency unless it is the agency of professional risk communicators educating the public. This analysis of the conflict over a radioactive incinerator in Livermore, California, emphasizes the fluidity of public perceptions of the incinerator and the agency of activists in shaping those perceptions in a (...) battle for rhetorical position with the U.S. Department of Energy. At a historical moment when the media was publicizing decades of environmental problems in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, activists were able to defeat the incinerator by creating a transitory alliance with local developers and by using rhetorical strategies that slyly undermined the official discourse on risk. (shrink)

This study presents an evolutionary game to model interactions among stakeholders with potential conflicts, including the operational enterprise of incineration plant, the local government, and the residents nearby. System dynamics is used to simulate the change of strategic actions corresponding to the three players, in order to seek for the evolutionary stability strategies. A numerical case is proposed to demonstrate the game theory application, in which the impacts of governmental incentive and punishment on the player’s actions are investigated. The results (...) indicated that administrative penalty is effective not only in motivating the enterprises to upgrade treatment facilities for ensuring environmental quality but also in helping the local government and residents to approach dominant strategies. Policy implications are given based on the results to lay out a foundation for the alleviation of the conflicts. (shrink)

Following a controversy over the construction of a waste incinerator in the Fos-sur-Mer industrial area, residents pointed to the lack of knowledge of the industry’s cumulative impact on their health and environment. Under pressure, some of their elected representatives supported the creation of an independent scientific organization, the Ecocitizen Institute for Pollution Awareness. Its objective was to conduct localized scientific research on the effects of pollution and to lobby the administration to change its regulatory practices. This paper examines the efforts (...) made to ensure that the “undone science” gets done, by focusing on the specificities of this industrialized site. We look at a participatory biomonitoring experiment that aimed to document pollution in the Gulf of Fos where scientists working for the IECP accepted anglers’ requests and switched from an acknowledged sentinel species to another species. We tell the many stories that were shared with us about how conger qualified as a more suitable “cosmopolitical fish” in the study of pollution. Elaborating on actor–network theory and multispecies ethnographies, we discuss the appropriateness of congers as the newly appointed sentinel species. We argue that this demonstrates the importance of the “ecology of relations” in maintaining the livability of the area. (shrink)

We conducted a survey of residents of Kingston, Ontario, Canada, (n = 107) to understand their attitudes to and experiences of waste management and governance. Currently, the municipality is emphasising waste diversion and exploring new waste processing systems (WPS; e.g., incineration) to reduce costs. Using Foucault's governmentality theory, our data suggest Kingston's reliance on an attitude-behaviour-context model of behaviour change successfully fosters an environmental citizenship identity based on waste diversion (e.g., recycling). However, we argue that the neoliberal governmentality upon which (...) the attitude-behaviour-context model is predicated elides the need for, and inhibits consideration of, broader societal change concerning urgent environmental issues involving consumption and waste. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Affective Account of MisknowingRoshni PatelIt is maintained that all beings and (their) qualitiesAre the fuel for the fire of awareness.Having been incinerated by brilliantTrue analysis, they are (all) pacified.—Ratnāvalī (RV)1.971In Nāgārjuna's formulation, ignorance about the nature of existents is scorching and thereby needs the alleviation that true analysis offers. This article explores what ignorance feels like from the subjective side of a knower in the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition (...) through an analysis of epistemic affect. I borrow two affective concepts—"epistemic emotion" and "epistemic feeling"—from theorists in Anglo-American analytic epistemology to discuss affectively charged misknowing.2 In this literature, epistemic emotions are affective experiences that participate in a knower's epistemic activity in positive or negative ways, but are not necessary for that activity to proceed. In contrast, epistemic feelings are affectively qualitative experiences that are integral to a knower's activity. With a focus on texts by Nāgārjuna, I present fear as a paradoxical epistemic emotion that correlates with a similarly pathogenic and instigative function in Buddhist moral psychology. I then present determinacy as a more subtly operating epistemic feeling in reificatory ignorance. In addition to expanding epistemologically oriented discussions within Buddhist philosophy, this article also contributes to scholarly discussion of epistemic affect by introducing determinacy as a new epistemic feeling. [End Page 44]Diffuse and Complex IgnoranceThe central role of ignorance in formulating the problem of suffering and its cessation implies that in many ways all of Buddhism is interested in how we know and understand. This centrality is evident in the Avijja Sutta when the Buddha states:Bhikkhus, ignorance is the forerunner in the entry upon unwholesome states, with shamelessness and fearlessness of wrongdoing following along. For an unwise person immersed in ignorance, wrong view springs up. For one of wrong view, wrong intention springs up. For one of wrong intention, wrong speech springs up. For one of wrong speech, wrong action springs up. For one of wrong action, wrong livelihood springs up. For one of wrong livelihood, wrong effort springs up. For one of wrong effort, wrong mindfulness springs up. For one of wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration springs up.(Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 45.1)Here we see that avijjā, or ignorance, impedes the path of removing suffering. Similarly, in the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance is at the start of the chain conditioning the other links that culminate in suffering (SN 12.2). Nāgārjuna also positions ignorance as a potential gatekeeper when he says that ignorance (ajñāna) causes some people to be intolerant of the wisdom of the Mahāyāna path taught by the Buddhas (RV 4.83).3 While we have ample exposition on the role of ignorance in various causal chains, what remains elusive is how to recognize our own ignorance as such in the experiential folds of seeing, feeling, and knowing. This is especially the case in the early works of the critical project of Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") philosophy by Nāgārjuna. The bulk of these works presents arguments against any ignorant metaphysics that essentializes existents in efforts to claim epistemic access to an objective ultimate reality. This article argues that through a certain way of reading Madhyamaka philosophical texts, we find helpful information for recognizing what ignorance feels like. I develop the phenomenology of epistemic emotions and feelings that coincide with the ignorant practices centrally targeted by Madhyamaka critical analysis.The encompassing scope of ignorance motivates us to conceive of it as entangled with a range of elements, including the affective components of knowing. While the terms avijjā or avidyā, are most often translated as "ignorance" this term can be problematically imprecise in philosophical contexts. In the subfield of ignorance studies within current Western philosophy, ignorance is often classified according to the object of which a subject lacks knowledge. By this paradigm, ignorance can be (1) factual in [End Page 45] the case of not knowing a particular fact, (2) erotetic when a subject does not know the answer to a question, or (3) practical when a subject does... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hurricane Gloria LAWRENCE DUGAN A screaming northern gale flew past his wild words And slammed the sails, and pulled a wave toward heaven. —Aeneid, i.102–3 (Sarah Ruden, trans.) i. A phalanx of weather tools at the door, A shovel, an ice-pick, an umbrella, A new cane, leaning against each other, Plastic fabricated to resist storms, Reminds me of a storm I rode out years ago, The Nor’easter of 1985, (...) On the twenty-first floor of 5 Penn Center Across the street from where the Fox Theater Spread the bright wings of its marquee, folded Now forever, torn down, and then replaced With a glass-box not unlike the office I looked out of, watching the rain lashing Windows, tearing at the flags hung on poles On other buildings, solitary banners Left up as if to challenge the weather To do its worst, to refute the young storm Tearing northeast out of the Atlantic, Predicted only a few days before As a hurricane, that didn’t happen, But leaving the high-rise building nearly Deserted, with the ticker still running Across the wall; the market had opened Empty office or not, unoccupied Desks giving it that strange quietude Peculiar to such spaces, which the mind Expects to be filled, even while seeing Otherwise. arion 28.2 fall 2020 66 hurricane gloria I felt like a sailor for The only time in my life, stepping off The elevator at 21, and then Walking into the main hall and sensing The building swayed slighty, barely feeling It but knowing it distinctly, hearing It creak exactly as I had heard ships At sea in dozens of movies, and with The sound, the sway, the massive grid of pipes And beams giving and taking. jms Old timers hadn’t warned me about this Although some had ridden out several Storms as bad, real or metaphorical, Not even old Harris who remembered Moving down from Susquehanna county In ’29, to Wall Street and the Crash. ii. Future archaeologists of urban Storms will study pictures of umbrellas Taking flight, wrecked synthetic shapes blooming Against resistant hands, then abandoned, Stuffed into trash cans, twirling down alleys, Pastels, stripes or old-fashioned banker-black, The edge of the story, the windy street’s Last rebuke to those daring to stagger To lunch but caught in the nor’easterly Gale’s grey wall of wind and rain that rattled Doors and buckled windows. The building held Two dozen companies, and I still like To think one fronted for an anchorite, Some isolated individual Up on 24, alone at his desk In a skyscraper office for ten years Praying, sometimes looking down the cliff walls At the peregrine falcons sweeping home Lawrence Dugan 67 To their massive nest stuffed tight in the bronze Lap of a statue seated on City Hall, One of the allegories of Founders And Lenape chiefs placed high over Broad, The hawks diving downward athwart the storm Coming on in grey curtains wavering Over the city and the Delaware Valley. Across the river in Jersey The pines begin, in Camden the street dirt Is sand; halfway to the shore the forest Runs above the expressway, farms below, The pines flourishing in sandy barren Earth lacking nitrogen, incinerating Every dozen years, thousands of acres Blowing away in flames seen at the shore. After that rain those woods were safe for weeks. iii. Ten years and two jobs later I needed Census material and found it online On a rainy day in Center City In a high-rise office nearby, a halfDay ’s work done to my surprise in only Twenty minutes, then realizing as I Stood up from a computer that the view Was familiar. I was back on 21 In my old office; jms had moved But the grey sky cleared with a sweep of wind And the view north and south looked as before Wherever the market’s ticker-tape rolled now. The weather had surprised me again; The only full rainbow I ever saw, The ancient sign that spares the world from floods, A pure unblemished iridescent span, Appeared late in spring, in a sun shower.... (shrink)

Retrouvée sur le territoire du Koinon des Bylliones, dans l’arrière‑pays d’Apollonia, l’épitaphe de Megallis non seulement enrichit le corpus des inscriptions grecques de la région, mais pose aussi le problème de l’identité des occupants de la nécropole. En effet, le mobilier funéraire, ainsi que le rite de l’incinération, renvoient à un contexte indigène, alors que le nom de la défunte est grec. Deux hypothèses sont alors envisageables ; la première fait de Megallis une Grecque d’origine qui se serait installée (...) dans la région. Dans ce cas on est dans une problématique qui est plutôt celle des mobilités en contexte colonial. La seconde est de faire de Megallis une indigène originaire du lieu, et dans ce cas on est dans une problématique d’acculturation, avec une « hellénisation » de l’onomastique illyrienne, comme conséquence de l’expansion du royaume épirote et de l’intensification des échanges avec les colonies grecques de la côte. (shrink)

Les références à la crémation sont extrêmement rares dans les textes bibliques. L’histoire de Saül et de ses trois fils reste un cas unique d’usage de l’incinération (1 S 31, 12-13). La signification de ce geste inhabituel dans le contexte biblique n’est pas claire. Depuis longtemps, le passage de 1 Samuel 31, 12 pose problème aux exégètes et aux historiens de la religion de l’ancien Israël. Cet article présente les diverses hypothèses qui furent proposées au sujet de la crémation (...) de Saül à partir de sources textuelles et matérielles provenant des fouilles de sépultures. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that the current incineration techniques of corpses are directly related to the Holocaust itself and its purposes. It is the same technique which, in the inhuman years of Nazi atrocities, was developed to be applied massively against the Jewish people and the other groups, because as a method it served and expressed both politically and ideologically the plan of a “final solution:” the final “dis-solution,” the disappearance of the human body even as (...) a residue, because the human body, even as a corpse, still retains identity and value. The findings of this study suggest a different analysis of the Nazis’ choice to eliminate the corpses of the Jews, while, at the same time, exploring the original approach offered here helps to understand better the value that the human corpse retains. Many social and religious groups that currently refuse to accept this way of managing human corpses become more understandable in their choice not to accept what nature itself denies but modern technique imposes, namely perfect oblivion, extinction of the corpse. Initially, it is presented in historical and intercultural terms in which ways human societies mainly behave towards the human corpse along with the most prevalent funeral burial customs. Subsequently, the semiology of the human corpse is evaluated in terms of philosophical aesthetics and is included in the corresponding aesthetic categories. Finally, this work airs and analyzes new bioethical issues which arise considering this ever-increasing tendency towards the practice of those responsible for the Holocaust, namely the disappearance of the human corpse. (shrink)

I recently read through the most recent 24 issues of Environmental Health Perspectives—the National Institutes of Health journal of, among other issues, scientific research into how environmental contaminants impact animal and human health. It is a catalog of horrors from a public health perspective. Fish and frogs with their sex scrambled; deformed frogs with altered hormone levels in their blood; a nearly threefold increase in birth defects among Minnesota farm children exposed to pesticides; 2,4-D exposure reducing hormone levels in men; (...) insignificant levels of four environmental chemicals adding up to a significant dose; a third study reconfirming a 50% sperm decline in U.S. men, 1934–1996; phthalates elevated in the blood of Puerto Rican girls developing breasts before they are 8; some 6,000 chemicals declared candidates for study as hormone disrupters ; children living near incinerators having delayed sexual development; hypospadias linked to organochlorine levels in the blood of mink, otter, and polar bears; and “No living organism may be considered DDT-free.” Nothing definitive, but it all suggests that things are tending in a direction that is perfectly awful. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 60–63 Translated by Rodrigo Maltez Novaes. From the forthcoming book Post-History , Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2013. It is not necessary to have a keen ear in order to find out that the steps we take towards the future sound hollow. But it is necessary to have concentrated hearing if one wishes to find out which type of vacuity resonates with our progress. There are several types of vacuity, and ours must be compared to others, if the aim (...) is to understand it. The incomparable is incomprehensible. If we affirm that our situation is incomparable, we give up the effort to grasp it. The comparison that imposes itself is to the vacuity of the Baroque. There are innumerable traces in the present that evoke the Baroque. We bear the mark of the same somber rationalism (logics, informatics, cybernetics), and of the same magic and fanatic irrationalism (mass media, phantastic ideologies). But there is a decisive difference. Humanity advanced over a stage during the Baroque. All of its gestures, even the most sincere, were marked by theatricality. The vacuity that resonated under its feet was of the void under the stage. Baroque man represented. 1 For example he represented faith in waging religious wars. Baroque vacuity was the consequence of a medieval loss of faith in dogmas . Our vacuity is different. We do not represent anything. Our world is not a stage. We are not actors, and if we act, it is not to represent a drama, but to divert the audience's attention and our own from the subjects that really matter. We act like criminals that try to hide their tracks. We pretend. Our progress is a farce. The vacuity under our feet is not Baroque. We have not lost our faith in dogmas: we have lost faith in ourselves . We are as counter-reformists as was the Baroque (we want to cover up the recent revolution with warm cloths), but for different reasons. Although comparable with the Baroque, in certain aspects, our situation is in fact incomparable to any other. That is because an incomparable, unheard of, never before seen event happened recently, which emptied the ground we tread. Auschwitz . Other posterior events; Hiroshima, the Gulags, are nothing but variations of the first. Therefore every attempt to grasp the present leads to the following questions: how was Auschwitz possible? How can we live after this? Such questions relate not only to the ones directly or indirectly responsible, and not only to those who were directly or indirectly hit by it: they relate to everyone who takes part in our culture. Because what is so incomparable, unheard of, never before seen and therefore incomprehensible in Auschwitz, is that it was there that Western culture revealed one of its inherent virtualities. Auschwitz is a characteristic realization of our culture. It is neither the product of a particular Western ideology, nor of specific “advanced” industrial techniques. It springs directly from the depths of culture and of its concepts and values. The possibility to realize Auschwitzes is implicit within our culture from the very start: the Western “project” already harbored it, although as a remote possibility. Auschwitz lies within the initial program of the West, which progressively realizes all of its virtualities as history unfolds. That is why the question that Auschwitz poses before us is not: how did it happen? It serves no purpose to “explain” Auschwitz. The fundamental question is: how was it possible? Because what is being questioned is not the extermination camp, but the West. Thus one other question: how to live within a culture henceforth unmasked? Everything that happened afterwards resonates with such a question, with such vacuity. Every economic, social, political, technical, scientific, artistic, philosophic event is corroded by such an undigested question. The distance that separates us from the event does not mitigate the abyss, it erodes it even deeper. Because the distance progressively dissolves the aura of the horror that envelops the event, and it progressively opens up a vision of the scene. It progressively reveals that there all of our categories, all of our “models”, suffered an irreparable shipwreck. Auschwitz was a revolutionary event, in the sense that it overthrew our culture. Insofar as we seek ways to cover up such revolution with trips to the moon or with genetic manipulations, we are counter-revolutionaries: we are inverting the course of history in order to cover up the past. The unspoken in Auschwitz is not the mass murder, it is not the crime . It is the ultimate reification of people into amorphous objects, into ashes. The Western tendency towards objectification was finally realized and it was done so in the shape of an apparatus . The SS were functionaries of an extermination apparatus, and their victims functioned in function of their own annihilation. The extermination camp's program, once it started functioning, developed in an automatic fashion, autonomous from the decisions of the initial programmers, even if, as it effectively did, it contributed to the defeat of the programmers. The SS and the Jews functioned one in function of the other like cogwheels. The models for such functionality were provided by the highest of Western values: the SS behaved like “heroes” and the Jews like “martyrs”. This is an apparatus that functions at a borderline situation: objective even beyond death. What has just been said is intolerable. We cannot accept it and so we mobilize arguments against it. Good arguments. The SS behaved like criminals: they removed the gold teeth from the cadavers. The Jews behaved like victims: they rose up in the Warsaw ghetto. Such arguments are true, but they do not reach the nucleus, the “ eidos ” of the phenomenon: they do not grasp it. Although there was “normal” behavior: (theft, murder, revolt, heroism), there was also “abnormal” behavior: functionality during a borderline situation. And this is what counts. There, for the first time in the history of humanity, an apparatus was put into operation that was programmed with the most advanced techniques available, which realized the objectification of man, together with the functional collaboration of man. The previous horrors committed by Western society against other societies and against itself (and there are many) were crimes . They were violations of Western models of behavior: anti-Christian, anti-human, irrational. So that it is possible to condemn them and continue to be Western, even if the horror is so colossal, such as the enslavement of Africans. However, it is not possible to condemn Auschwitz and continue to adhere consciously to the West. Auschwitz is not a violation of Western models of behavior, it is, on the contrary, the result of the application of such models. Our culture allowed its mystifying mask to fall and must be rejected in toto if we admit that the purpose of every culture is to allow for the convivial existence of men that recognize each other mutually as subjects. However: it is not possible to reject one's own culture. It is the ground we tread . Those who seek to reject their own culture (as Nietzsche did in rejecting Judeo-Christianity), fall victim to madness. Those who reject their culture's models, are incapable of grasping the world in which they live. Cultural models are traps to catch the world. Those who seek to substitute their own models for other's (for example by shouting “Hare Krishna”) will find that such exotic models have already been caught by the very models to be substituted. There is no exit: we are condemned to use our models and to serve such models, even after they have been unmasked, if we wish to continue living. The only alternative would be to commit suicide. That is: we must continue our economic, political, scientific, artistic, philosophic activities despite Auschwitz. We must continue progressing despite everything . That is why there are those who recommend that we should seek to forget what happened, that we should repress the event. They sustain that enough has already been said and written about the subject and that it is time to “overcome” it. But such an ostrich strategy reveals itself disastrous. Because the result is that Auschwitz transfers itself from Poland of the 1940s to the post-industrial society of the future. What characterizes the extermination camp is precisely that it is not an event that can be “overcome”, because it is the first realization of an inherent virtuality within the Western project, which will repeat itself in other formats unless we become totally conscious of it. The advantage (if this is an appropriate term) that Auschwitz offers us, is to give us a concrete example of the West’s tendency towards the apparatus. For the first time in our history it is possible for us to experience concretely the utopia inherent in our culture. For the first time in our history we have the experience that utopia, no matter in what form, towards which we progress, is the extermination camp. Everywhere we can observe, as of now, the emergence of variations on the theme “Auschwitz”. Everywhere apparatus spring, just like mushrooms after a Nazi rain, from the ground that has become rotten. Certainly: such new apparatus are not externally similar to the Nazi extermination camps. Their labels are different, as are the ideologies that pretend to inspire them. Even the apparatus that admittedly envision extermination, such as the Gulags, the ones of a future nuclear war, or the ones that functioned in Vietnam, claim to be different from Auschwitz. Others claim to be “friends of mankind”, such as the scientific, technical and administrative apparatus. But such labels and such ideologies are deceptive and serve only to cover up the essence of apparatus. They are all just like Auschwitz, black boxes that function with complex inner-workings in order to realize a program. They all function according to an inertia that is inherent to them and such functionality escapes , from a certain point, the control of their initial programmers. In a final analysis such apparatuses function, all of them, towards the annihilation of all their functionaries, including their programmers. Exactly because they objectify and dehumanize man. Thus Western culture reveals itself as a project that seeks to transform itself into an apparatus. What characterizes the West is its capacity for an objectifying transcendence. Such transcendence allows for the transformation of all phenomena, including the human phenomenon, into an object of knowledge and manipulation. The space for such transcendence opened up thanks to Judeo-Christianity and resulted, in the course of our history, in science, technique and recently, in Auschwitz. The ultimate objectification of the Jews into ashes is the ultimate victory of the spirit of the West. It is social technique taken to the extreme. Certainly: the transformation of men into ashes is primitive, incipient social technique that progressively refines itself. It will be followed by less brutal objectifications, such as the robotization of society. But it does not matter which form it will assume: it will always be an objectifying manipulation of mankind. Although the apparatus of the immediate future are not necessarily incineration ovens, all will be, and not only the nuclear ones, apparatus for the annihilation of man. The Western program contains several virtualities, not only apparatus. Numerous virtualities have not yet been realized. In this sense the “history of the West” has not ended yet, the Western game continues. But all not-yet realized virtualities are infected by apparatus. That is why it has become currently impossible to engage ourselves in the “ progress of culture .” As it would be to engage ourselves in our own annihilation. We have lost our faith in our culture, in the ground we tread. That is: we have lost faith in ourselves. It is this hollow vibration that follows our steps towards the future. What remains is for us to analyze the event “Auschwitz” in all its details in order to discover the fundamental project that realized itself there for the first time, so that we may nurture the hope to project ourselves out of that project. Out of the history of the West. This is the “post- historical” climate in which we are condemned to live from hereon. NOTES 1. In Portuguese representar (to represent) also means “to act” or “to play a role.&rdquo. (shrink)

This contribution to the final installment of the Common Knowledge symposium on contextualism is a reply to another contribution, Peter Burke's “Alternative Modes of Thought.” Or rather, this essay responds to the historians and social scientists whom Burke cites as arguing that only some ways of thinking are possible in any given place and time. Richmond's response is that a human context in which there is but one mode of thought in evidence, and no evident ambivalence regarding it, is a (...) context in which great numbers have died, violently and recently. His essay takes the form of a report on his eleven research visits since 1985 to the death camp at Auschwitz. In Nazi-occupied Europe, he concludes, “ ‘alternative modes of thought’ were by no means impossible. Rather, people who thought differently from the regime were gathered to Auschwitz and other such camps, then murdered and incinerated. The Nazi ‘mental framework,’ if that is what it was, had to be imposed, and the millions incapable of participating in it had to die rapidly.... The problem for us, in the Nazis’ wake, is that the their ‘mode of thought’ is so alien that we have yet to find a context that enables us to understand it.... The need, then, is not for the context that intellectual, cultural, and social historians might provide, but for the aid of phenomenologists, because what we are hoping to understand is—in the words of Thomas Nagel's essay ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’—a ‘fundamentally alien form of life.’ ”. (shrink)

Much as developing countries have been saddled with unwanted incinerators, refineries, waste dumps, or dangerous assembly sectors in an era of global outsourcing, a great many U.S. rural communities have in the last decade and a half found themselves face-to-face with massive industrial livestock complexes. This article examines the alliances that emerged in opposition to corporate livestock complexes including farm and rural community associations and environmental organizations. This study of anti-factory farm campaigns in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Missouri examines the circumstances (...) under which broad-based coalitions opposing powerful corporate interests emerge, and what such alliances do and do not achieve under given institutional circumstances. (shrink)