We argue that the two temporal cognition systems are conceptually too confined to be helpful in understanding the evolution of temporal cognition. In fact, we doubt there are two systems. In relation to this, we question that the authors did not describe the results of our planning study on ravens correctly, as this is of consequence to their theory.

We are not entirely satisfied with the evolutionary explanation provided by Suddendorf & Corballis (S&C) for why only humans should be capable of advanced mental time travel. General social factors do not suffice, given that other primates are also highly social. We discuss the evolutionary mechanisms that have generated mental time travel typical to humans, focusing on ecological factors.

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: I would like to highlight a mechanism that is vital for the anticipating self: the formation of sensations detached from the current environment. Without a sensing self it would be impossible to project oneself into possible futures of a certain kind – futures that are simulated in the kind of inner world that provides the subject with (...) affective experiences . (shrink)