In her chapter “Models of knowledge in the Zhuangzi: Knowing with chisels and sticks,” Karyn L. Lai ponders Confucius’s conversation with the cicada catcher in the Zhuangzi. Lai asks, “What does the cicada catcher know that Confucius doesn’t?” The knowledge that Confucius and his disciples seek may be precisely what they can never have. I explore the epistemological rift between ways of knowing by applying Karen Amimoto Ingersoll’s distinction between “seascape epistemology” (based on Native Hawaiian, Kānaka Maoli, ways of knowing) (...) and Western epistemology (framed as girding neocolonialist expansion on the Hawaiian Islands). (shrink)

This paper aims to address when the wise person should participate in politics. The question is addressed through engagement with the Analects. Rather than provide interpretations of key terms in the Analects, we provide an account of wisdom that draws from themes in the Analects. The case is made that the wise person is committed to participating in politics primarily because of the connection between wisdom and benevolence (ren 仁 in the Analects). We address challenges to the Confucian approach from (...) the Zhuangzi concerning the potential harms of political participation. General political disengagement is not considered exemplary on the Confucian approach to wisdom, although when political engagement may be eschewed is explored. Finally, the case is made that while ren motivates the wise to participate politically, the wise also have a sense of timeliness that provides guidance as to when to refrain or withdraw from political participation. (shrink)

Place was the theme of the 11th East-West Philosophers’ Conference, held in the urban heart of the Islands, Honolulu, from May 24-31, 2016.

This chapter is a sustained reflection on the sorts of place-based knowledge that characterise making one’s way around in a Ruist world. As we know, Confucius and Mencius spent much of their lives travelling, and, I argue, this was essential in forming their vision of a comprehensive and cohesive world order. I suggest three motifs for place-based knowing: terrestrial geography, metaphysical geography, and moral geography. Terrestrial geography includes physical, topographical, and social geographical paradigms. These are connected by the importance of (...) travel, by way of which one experiences the physical counterparts of such thematic analogies as lofty mountains and resolute evergreens. Finding and forging pathways through life and avoiding stagnating dead-ends reveal the second motif, metaphysical geography. In metaphysical geography, the metaphor of smooth movement along clear paths represents success, understanding, even wisdom. Blocked, unnavigable, and dead-end paths represent failure, confusion, and ignorance. In moral geography, space, time, people, events, and things are oriented and relationally connected via moral landmarks and ties. Knowing what to do on behalf of oneself and the world is the most epistemologically potent geographical knowledge one may have. It requires a depth of knowledge both of oneself and the world, as well as how one’s moral acts will have the most profound effects. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss a potential nexus for comparison between Hawaiian and Chinese philosophies grounded in what I call “terrestrial identity”. I bring Fei Xiaotong’s description of the formation of social identity in China, which is historically agrarian and inalienably place-based, to meet contemporary Hawaiian philosophical perspectives of personal responsibility, genealogical consciousness, and “seascape epistemology” to flesh out a new theory of relationality, one that includes the ontological, historical, and ethical relationship of humans to the land on which they (...) orient themselves and that defines the circumstances of their lives. The concept of terrestrial identity is inclusive in terms of types of relational entities, accommodating place, space, and memory into a comprehensive social ontology. It also opens onto discussions of contemporary social problems in a way that centres place and contextuality. I will conclude this essay with such a discussion, regarding homelessness among Kānaka Maoli. (shrink)

The Philosophical Challenge from China, edited by Brian Bruya, undoubtedly occupies an important place in the discourse about what practices and authorities are relevant to Philosophy as an academic discipline. Its confident reorientation of philosophical relevance in the context of Anglophone academics will hopefully speak meaningfully to any remaining skeptics of the usefulness of Chinese philosophy. The intended audience of this effort, however, is shrinking, or, more accurately, those willing to be convinced are increasingly few, and what remains is simply (...) and haplessly the staunch traditionalists of the so-called Western paradigm. This evokes the thought that anthologies that strive to show relevance... (shrink)