The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):533-537 (2009)
| Abstract | The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. 1992). But where the former use phenomenology in the background as broad context and Dreyfus uses it primarily (though not exclusively) as a critique of conventional AI, Gallagher and Zahavi wish to indicate a positive and constructive place for it within cognitive science. They do not recommend that we simply accept pronouncements of thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau‐Ponty and apply them to questions of cognition, but that we use revised forms of phenomenology to illuminate dimensions of cognitive experience that are missing in current research. The book is presented as an “introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science” written from a phenomenological perspective. It seeks to justify the use of phenomenology in cognitive science by showing what kinds of questions it asks and answers, the variety of uses to which it has recently been put and the fruitfulness of some of its findings. The catalog of topics, for the most part, matches other introductions to the philosophy of mind, such as questions of method, consciousness, perception, intentionality, embodiment, action, agency and other minds. One issue presented here that is not generally dealt with in existing philosophy of mind and cognitive science texts is temporality, a mainstay of the continental tradition. After an introductory chapter that places phenomenology in the context of other approaches, the book lays out the main tenets of phenomenological method. Here, one encounters expected components of phenomenology: the epoché (described below), phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and so on. This traditional fare is soon followed by some potential surprises, namely, attempts to “naturalize” phenomenology, a few attempts to formalize it, and the emergence of ‘neurophenomenology’. Each of these is a bit surprising because Husserl was a vocal critic of naturalism, seeing transcendental phenomenology as an alternative to the empirical study of consciousness. He was also skeptical about the possibilities of mathematizing phenomenology. Gallagher and Zahavi acknowledge these points, but since they are not repeating history or undertaking exegesis, strict adherence to canonical phenomenology is not required. Naturalizing phenomenology means recognizing that “the phenomena it studies are part of nature and are therefore also open to empirical investigation” (p.. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJ. Toribio (2009). Review: Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi: The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (469):174-177.
P. Sven Arvidson (2003). A Lexicon of Attention: From Cognitive Science to Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):99-132.
Sara Heinämaa (1999). Merleau-Ponty's Modification of Phenomenology: Cognition, Passion and Philosophy. Synthese 118 (1):49-68.
Dan Zahavi (2002). First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
Shaun Gallagher (1997). Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.
Alessandra Tanesini (2008). Intentionality and the Externalism Versus Internalism Debate. Abstracta 2:45-53.
Rocco Marchitelli (2010). Francisco Varela's View on Phenomenology in His Cognitive Interpretation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 3 (2):42-44.
Andrew Brook (2008). Phenomenology: Contribution to Cognitive Science. Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE II, Pp. 54 – 70, 2008:54-70.
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