Freedom and recognition in Hegel and Habermas
Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (1):1-17 (2002)
| Abstract | Contrary to some popular interpretations, I argue that Hegel and Habermas share many basic assumptions in their respective accounts of freedom. In particular, both respond to weaknesses in Kant's idea of freedom as acting from (certain kinds of) reasons by explicating this idea with reference to specific social practices or 'forms of recognition' that in turn express suppositions and expectations that actors adopt with respect to one another. I illustrate this common strategy in each and suggest that it may offer an alternative to Rawls's 'political' account of public reason. Key Words: freedom • Habermas • Hegel • intersubjectivity • Kant • positive liberty • practical reason • public reason • rational action • Rawls • recognition. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJonathan Peterson (2008). Enlightenment and Freedom. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 223-244.
G. Khan (2012). Politics and Morality in Habermas' Discourse Ethics. Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (2):149-168.
Italo Testa (2009). Criticism and Normativity. Brandom and Habermas Between Kant and Hegel. In D. Canale G. Tuzet (ed.), The Rules of Inference. Inferentialism in Law and Philosophy, Egea, Milano. Egea (pp. pp. 29-44).
Alan Patten (1999). Hegel's Idea of Freedom. Oxford University Press.
Robert Sinnerbrink (2004). Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition. Critical Horizons 5 (1):271-295.
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