Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):286-287 (2003)
|Abstract||Hurford's argument suffers from two major weaknesses. First, his account of neural mechanisms suggests no place in the brain where the two halves of a predicate-argument structure could come together. Second, his assumption that language and cognition must be based on logic is neither necessary nor particularly plausible, and leads him to some unlikely conclusions.|
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