On Second Thought, Libet-style Unreflective Intentions May Be Compatible With Free Will

Logoi 39 (23):17-28 (2021)
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Abstract

Some have argued that our sense of free will is an illusion. And some base this free will skepticism on claims about when we become consciously aware of our intentions. Evidence suggests that unreflective intentions form before we are conscious of them. And that is supposed to challenge our sense of free will. This inference from unreflective intention to free will skepticism may seem intuitive at first. However, upon reflection, this argument seems to entail a magical view of free will. So, insofar as free will does not require magic, unreflective intentions do not necessarily undermine our sense of free will.

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Nick Byrd
Stevens Institute of Technology

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References found in this work

The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.

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