||Most philosophers and laypeople believe that under most conditions human beings, perhaps along with some other animals, possess a power of selecting and implementing actions which is special. This power is very widely held to be a necessary condition of responsibility for actions, for autonomy and for being entitled to take pride in (or to feel shame for) one's achievements. The free will debate in philosophy aims at elucidating the nature of that power as well as at identifying potential threats to it and explaining how it can exist. A major focus of the debate is the compatibility of free will with causal determinism. A minority of philosophers deny that we have free will because free will is incompatible with causal determinism.
||The free will debate is ancient in Western philosophy, but was first developed systematically by scholastic thinkers concerning about the relationship free will and God's foreknowledge (eg Ockham 1983). The rise of mechanistic science brought determinism to the forefront and played an important role in the development of compatibilism by philosophers like Hume (Hume 1777). The advent of Frankfurt-style cases (Frankfurt 1969) transformed the late 20th century debate, by allowing compatibilists to dispense with the principle of alternate possibilities (see McKenna & Widerker 2003 for important contributions to this debate). At the same time, important new libertarian views have been developed by thinkers like Robert Kane (Kane 1996) and Timothy O'Connor (O'Connor 2000). Very recently, there has been a revival of free will skepticism (Strawson 1994; Levy 2011).
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History/traditions: Free Will
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Material to categorize
- Ian Barbour (1955). Indeterminacy and Freedom: A Reappraisal. Philosophy of Science 22 (1):8-20.
- Ermanno Bencivenga (1990). Free From What? Erkenntnis 33 (1):9 - 21.
- Fred Berthold (1981). Free Will and Theodicy in Augustine: An Exposition and Critique. Religious Studies 17 (4):525.
- Susanne Bobzien (1993). Determinism and Free Will in Stoic Philosophy.
- Svante Bohman (1977). Analyses of Consciousness as Well as Observation, Volition and Valuation. Almqvist & Wiksell International (Distr.).
- M. Keith Booker (1994). Vargas Llosa Among the Postmodernists.
- John Bourke (1938). Responsibility, Freedom and Determinism. Philosophy 13 (51):276 - 287.
- R. D. Bradley (1962). 'Ifs', 'Cans' and Determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):146 – 158.
- Matthew Braham & Martin van Hees (2012). An Anatomy of Moral Responsibility. Mind 121 (483):601 - 634.
- Thomas Campbell Brickhouse (1974). Determinism and Aristotle's Analysis of Responsibility. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
- James Brown (1973). Essays on Freedom of Action. Philosophical Studies 22:297-299.
- Douglas Browning (1964). The Feeling of Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):123 - 146.
- Douglas Browning (1963). Free Acts and Free Men. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):15-20.
- Charles Theodore Burnett (1908). A Fundamental Test for Determinism. International Journal of Ethics 18 (2):220-225.
- E. S. C. (1962). An Inquiry Into the Freedom of Decision. Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):167-167.
- E. S. C. (1962). Free Action. Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):166-167.
- L. C. (1966). Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism. Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):379-379.
- L. C. (1966). Human Freedom and the Self. Review of Metaphysics 19 (3):583-583.
- Steven M. Cahn (2009). Freedom or Determinism? In Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
- David Carr (1989). Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Philosophical Books 30 (4):229-232.
- Toby Castleton (1992). Logical Determinism, Causal Determinism, and Free Will. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Jacques-Jean Caubet (1994). La Science Contre le Destin Quand la Science Retrouve les Racines Naturelles de la Liberté. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
- Timothy Chambers (2003). Free Will Defense: Do the Ends Justify the Means? Philosophia Christi 5 (1):251-258.
- Peter Clark (1995). Popper on Determinism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:149-162.
- Randolph Kent Clarke (1990). An Agent-Causal View of Free Will. Dissertation, Princeton University
- Guy Claxton (1999). Whodunnit? Unpicking Theseems' of Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):8-9.
- Philip Clayton (2009). Constraint and Freedom in the Movement From Quantum Physics to Theology. In F. LeRon Shults, Nancey C. Murphy & Robert J. Russell (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Divine Action. Brill.
- Marshall Cohen (ed.) (1974). War and Moral Responsibility: A "Philosophy and Public Affairs" Reader. Princeton University Press.
- Darrel D. Colson (1982). The Transcendental Argument Against Determinism: A Challenge yet Unmet. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):15-24.
- Stephen S. Colvin (1904). The Problem of Psychological Determinism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (22):589-595.
- John J. Compton (2001). The Persistence of the Problem of Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):95 - 115.
- John J. Compton (1973). Responsibility and Agency. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-2):83-89.
- Jay Angelo Corlett (1992). Moral Compatibilism: Rights, Responsibility, Punishment and Compensation. Dissertation, The University of Arizona
- Richard H. Corrigan (forthcoming). Could God Know What I Would Freely Do? Philosophical Frontiers: Essays and Emerging Thoughts.
- Christopher Cowley (2014). Moral Responsibility. Routledge.
- G. W. Cunningham (1908). Determinism and Indeterminism in Motives: A Rejoinder. Philosophical Review 17 (1):66-67.
- F. D. D. (1975). The Cosmology of Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):762-762.
- Willard F. Day (1972). The Case for Determinism. Philosophical Studies 21:31-40.
- Victorino De La Fuente (1967). The Normal Pattern of Man's Ethical Behaviour. New York, Pageant Press.
- William James Eugene Dempsey (1929). Freedom or Necessity. [Washington].
- Daniel C. Dennett (1973). Mechanism and Responsibility. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 157--84.
- Daniel Deudney (1999). Firming the Foundations : Constitutionalizing and Memorializing the Free World Complex. In Josef Janning, Charles Kupchan & Dirk Rumberg (eds.), Civic Engagement in the Atlantic Community. Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.
- Thomas Digby (1983). Corporations and Morality. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):921-922.
- Neelke Doorn, Nicole A. Vincent & Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist (2006). International Conference on Moral Responsibility: Neuroscience. Economics and Philosophy 22:409-427.
- Donal J. Dorr (1968). Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 17:296-296.
- Paula Droege (2010). The Role of Unconsciousness in Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5-6.
- R. A. Duff (1980). Freewill and Responsibility. Philosophical Books 21 (1):52-54.
- Steven M. Duncan (2012). Yeomans, Christopher. Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency. Review of Metaphysics 66 (1):174-175.
- Frank B. Ebersole (1952). Free-Choice and the Demands of Morals. Mind 61 (242):234-257.
- Berkley B. Eddins (1963). Empiricism, Necessity and Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 16 (3):556 - 558.
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