Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper aims to reconcile presentism with truthmaker theory. I begin by motivating the reconciliation. In section 2 I ask what is wrong with the Lucretian strategy of grounding 'there were dinosaurs' in the world’s instantiating 'being such that there were dinosaurs'. I aim to pinpoint what is peculiar about such properties and hence to say what kind of properties the presentist needs in order to give an acceptable reconciliation; in section 3 I argue that certain distributional properties do the job. In 4 I deal with some potential objections to the presentist appealing to such properties. In 5 I show how the presentist who accepts my view can deal with the open future; this raises questions concerning how to give truthmakers for indeterminate and determinate truths, which are dealt with in section 6. In section 7 I ask whether my solution can be generalised to reconcile actualism and here-now-ism with truthmaker theory and argue that in the former case at least, it can’t.|
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