A coherent moral relativism

Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430 (2009)
Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
Keywords Moral relativism  Alethic pluralism  Truth  Coherence
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DOI 10.2307/40271149
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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Citations of this work BETA
Iris Einheuser (2012). Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):590-603.
Michael P. Lynch (2013). Expressivism and Plural Truth. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.

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