Consequences of Comparability

Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):70-98 (2021)
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Abstract

We defend three controversial claims about preference, credence, and choice. First, all agents (not just rational ones) have complete preferences. Second, all agents (again, not just rational ones) have real-valued credences in every proposition in which they are confident to any degree. Third, there is almost always some unique thing we ought to do, want, or believe.

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Author Profiles

Cian Dorr
New York University
Jake Nebel
Princeton University
Jake Zuehl
New York University

References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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